Tuesday, 11/3/2020 [Weather] and [Flight Articles] by [Mitch] [Sundowner] [Chelsea] [Austin]

11/3/2020
Pine OTB Rotor Reserve Deploy / Comment by Sundowner

[See also Chelsea's Narrative]

Eddie Rickenbacker, our most decorated US WWI ace, has been quoted saying that anyone can learn from their own mistakes, but to survive you need to learn from the mistakes of others.  I'd like to think that I'm a better pilot this year compared to last year, but to achieve that objective I need to be self critical and objectively review both victories and failures.

I naturally feel somewhat culpable for Tuesday's events for a number of reasons.  I promoted the day and proclaimed it would likely be suitable for P2 pilots with supervision.  I also posted that we might need to use the north launch but would likely be able to get off from the south side.  The forecast was for light wind.  Based on my reading of the tea leaves I was hoping for a convergence and big altitude over launch.  The weather did not unfold as expected.  Based on the forecast and our observations on the way up to launch, I thought the wind was less than it was.

I've often professed that for the most part (with some exceptions) we don't have advanced sites, but rather advanced conditions.  I do think Pine Mountain is suitable for P2 pilots in the right conditions, even first high flight pilots.  The big hazard of taking green pilots to Pine is the time risk because Pine is one of our least predictable sites and it is a significant time commitment to travel there.

I do think the conditions at Pine's 5650 North Side Launch on Tuesday were suitable for P2 pilots with supervision.  The conditions at the south launch were questionable for advanced pilots (3 pilots launched from the south side on Tuesday, Mitch, Austin, and Brett).  The conditions OTB behind the north launch below ridgeline in the rotor weren't suitable for anyone including advanced pilots.  The back side of the North Launch is steep.  If you go OTB low in the wind, the terrain profile is important.

So... when flying in ridge lift it is generically important to be aware of the penetration scenario and guard against getting too far back because you might get pinned in the venturi acceleration above the ridge line.  Without naming names I will also note that getting too far back is a common rookie mistake having been made by many now prominent local pilots

The supervision thing.  I was the senior pilot leading the remaining group and accepted some degree of responsibility for the general welfare of the crew.  For me that responsibility is more than simply urging caution.  It also includes other factors like time risk and reward.  One of my objectives is the hope that as many pilots as possible can achieve rewarding flights and grow our pilot community, which entails a rabbit hole of other risk reward evaluations.

I probably should have been clued in about the wind when I watched 3 pilots launch and plummet from the south side launch.  I gave a briefing to the remaining 3 pilots (Chelsea, Nick from Alaska, and Pasio from Ojai) at the bottom of the 300 yard hike to launch without actually being on launch, leaving them with my projection that I'd be back in about an hour plus another 20 minutes to hike up.  I then continued down to find and reboost any pilots who had landed on the south side.  I can't remember details of the briefing, but I did say that they could launch before I got back if they liked what they saw.  One of the pilots (Pasio) had a single prior flight from the south launch but none of the 3 pilots had flown or previously seen the north launch.

The wind on the deck seemed light.  So light that I was concerned that it might not be soarable.  When I got back from the south side retrieve Pasio was airborne a couple hundred over and illustrating that the velocity above the hill was more than on the deck, maybe 12 mph? and more in the venturi.  Chelsea was ready to pull up at the end of my hike.  I asked her to wait for another briefing.  I might have noted something about the altitude being worth more out front, but also indicated that to get up she might need to figure 8 in tight when low.  I also recommend that if she didn't get at least 500 over launch that she should not attempt to go uphill and instead choose to follow the spine out to landing on the north side.

Pasio was last seen working his way toward the top of the hill having successfully made the first uphill connection (he eventually climbed to 7800).  I watched Chelsea for a few minutes after she launched, but I was anxious to get airborne myself as the day was getting late.  Chelsea had a good launch and seemed to be mechanically flying the glider well and also tracking the lift nicely.  I only met Chelsea that morning and had never seen her fly.  I did listen on the way to launch and had a fuzzy perception that she had a season or 2 under her belt having flown multiple sites in various locals but might still be somewhat of a novice?  By the time I launched Chelsea had "disappeared" and no one knew where she was.  I looked for her after getting airborne but did not see any other gliders.  I started hearing weak and broken radio transmissions from Chelsea after I had made the uphill connection.  There was some discussion about inReach texting, and the other pilots seemed clued into what was going on so I focused on my flight.  I eventually realized that she was in a tree below ridgeline on south side, but not physically injured.  Pasio also reported that he had come up short of Hwy 33 after going OTB and landed out but unhurt on a south side ranch road.

I didn't realize the extreme predicament that Chelsea dealt with until we briefly chatted during our end of the day Viola Fields rendezvous for gear exchange, and I didn't actually realize she had thrown her reserve until I read her narrative.

So what is the takeaway?  The most obvious is penetration and angle awareness when flying in ridge lift and tracking thermals back   I've reviewed what I might have personally done differently or better.  I don't see glaring issues.  Perhaps I was overly self absorbed once I got airborne but in my self defense, once I achieved a sketchy awareness that Chelsea was down and not hurt there wasn't much I could do to alter the outcome and 3 other pilots including her travel  mate were in rescue mode.  I do think that if Chelsea had direct supervision or perhaps a better briefing she might have avoided her scary rotor ride.  I kinda left the initial briefing to Mitch but did assume that role once Mitch had departed.  We try to be good host to a lot of visiting and transient pilots but that is a balancing act that might benefit from a tweak or two where we can identify polish potential .

At the end of the day.  Good judgment comes from experience, and experience is often gained by exercising poor judgment.  I've exercised my share of poor judgment and am hopefully a better person today than I was on Monday...

[See also Chelsea's Narrative]

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